„[…] This public, intense Islamist anger over official [Saudi] policy toward Egypt could have domestic political ramifications, at least at the margins. The co-optation of the Sahwa Islamist networks was a key part of the Saudi survival strategy in the early days of the Arab uprisings. Key sahwa figures such as Salman al-Awda have been increasingly critical, however, as with his scathing open letter on the need for political reform released in March. The argument over Egypt may further push them apart. As for Kuwait, criticism over Egypt plays into its interminable political crisis, and will likely only intensify the existing polarization. After opposition movements including the Islamic Constitutional Movement organized a protest outside of Egypt’s Embassy, a leading pro-government politician warned ominously against any sign of penetration by Egyptian Muslim Brothers. None of this is likely to lead to an uprising or the like, but it puts the monarchs in an unaccustomed defensive position.
The greater impact might be felt in Syria, however. These Islamist networks and personalities have been instrumental in building support and raising money for the various factions of the Syrian opposition. Now, they are prominently equating Egypt’s General Abdel Fattah al-Sissi with Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. Suwaidan, for instance, proclaims that „the right is clearly with the revolutionaries in Syria and with those who adhere to legitimacy and reject the coup in Egypt.“ What will happen if the Islamist networks which have been working to support the Syrian opposition begin to turn their fundraising and mobilizational efforts to Egypt?“