Frontex official publications fall into four main categories: risk analysis, training, operations and research, each marked with a distinct graphic identifier. Risk analysis publications bear a triangular symbol formed by an arrow drawing a triangle, with a dot at the centre. Metaphorically, the arrow represents the cyclical nature of risk analysis processes and its orientation towards an appropriate operational response. The triangle is a symbol of ideal proportions and knowledge, reflecting the pursuit of factual exactness, truth and exhaustive analysis. The dot at the centre represents the intelligence factor and the focal point where information from diverse sources converges to be processed, systematised and shared as analytical products. Thus, Frontex risk analysis is meant to be at the centre and to form a reliable basis for its operational activities.

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Executive summary

The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC) has been constantly developing its analytical and information-sharing capacity since its inception in 2010. This third AFIC Joint Annual Report is a culmination of these efforts. The report contains four blocks: update on irregular migration flows between Africa and Europe, a scan of the most pertinent regional security risks, an issue in focus (looking into border-related impact of the recent Ebola outbreak) and a comprehensive set of conclusions that provide guidance as to the further development of the AFIC.

Responding to proposals by AFIC participants, analysis and information used for this report is much less EU-centred and data-driven. Instead, it relies mainly on the contributions from African partners only complemented by information available to Frontex, focusing on the situation in Africa itself. However, this third AFIC Joint Report introduces the idea of risks as defined by the methodology used in the context of EU border management. This novel approach (for the AFIC) allows structuring of information into different elements of risk: threat, vulnerability and impact.

With regards to irregular flows, the most important developments occurred on routes that are linking sub-Saharan Africa with Libya and further on with Italy. Namely, there was a sharp increase in the number of irregular migrants detected and/or rescued in the Central Mediterranean region. A large majority of all migrants transited through Libya before attempting maritime crossing towards the EU. There are indications suggesting that the overall yearly number of arrivals in the Central Mediterranean during 2014 could exceed 150,000, given that a large number of migrants from sub-Saharan and Horn of African countries, as well as Syrian nationals, are currently staying in the coastal areas of Libya.

Authorities in Niger estimate that roughly 80% of migrants transiting Niger move to Libya and the rest are targeting Algeria. They assess that between 1,000 and 1,500 sub-Saharan migrants enter Libya illegally each week. These migrants arrive in Niger legally (with ECOWAS travel documents) using several direct bus connections linking Senegal or Ghana with Agadez in Niger. The price for a trip in a fully loaded off-road vehicle to Libya is about EUR 5,000. In extreme cases there are up to 30 migrants in each such vehicle bringing down the cost per migrant to EUR 15–50.

While most of the flow is bound towards Libya, authorities in Niger started to notice that a lot of sub-Saharans are now returning back to Niger. In addition, other nationalities (e.g. Pakistanis) are also using this route to escape the chaos in Libya.

There were no significant changes in migratory routes linking Morocco or Algeria with the EU. The pressure was at the land borders between Ceuta or Melilla and Morocco, where attempts to storm the fences have continued in earnest. Main nationalities of migrants trying to illegally enter the EU from Morocco were Malians, Cameroonians and Guineans. In fact, a large majority of all irregular migrants (detected either by Morocco or by Spain) were from sub-Saharan Africa.

Information from Moroccan authorities indicates that the main entry route to Morocco for many sub-Saharan Africans runs through the Moroccan-Algerian land border. However, during 2014 the routing through Algeria became more difficult due to changes related to
the border management in Algeria. Migrants from Senegal head for Morocco overland or by air. The use of charter flights from Casablanca to small European airports has been also identified.

Apart from smuggling of migrants, several AFIC countries reported that trafficking in human beings represented a serious concern. In Nigeria, for example, victims are trafficked both domestically and outside the country. They have been trafficked throughout West Africa to countries such as Ghana and the Central African Republic, and there are also extensive human-trafficking flows from Nigeria to Europe, as Nigerian victims have been reported in at least 20 European countries. Additionally, children from Benin, Ghana and Togo are trafficked to Nigeria and forced to work in labour-intensive industries.

The abuse of travel documents is also a major concern for all AFIC countries. Information provided in the context of AFIC joint risk analysis suggests that abuse of authentic documents seemed to be the main issue. This is often facilitated through the two main weak points in the document security chain – civil registries and corruption.

Overall, the context in which border control authorities in AFIC countries operate is increasingly complicated by a very volatile security situation. By and large, terrorism, kidnapping for ransom, sectarian violence and proliferation of different armed terrorist groups remain the greatest security threats. In addition, Libya is rapidly becoming a failed state with large areas of its territory under the rule of different militias and armed groups.

Other complicating factors include the Ebola virus outbreak and the fact that peace talks aimed at ending the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali are still far from over while activities of Boko Haram are also on the rise, especially in the border regions of northern Nigeria.

Among others, efforts to stop the spread of Ebola have included border closures, restricting internal movements and temporary suspension of flights departing from the four West African countries.

Border closure largely amounts to the closure of official land border-crossing points and is usually effected using very rudimentary technical means. Therefore, containing the virus through closure of land borders remains an almost impossible task given the difficulties faced by border authorities in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea and the notorious porosity of borders in West Africa.

Finally, AFIC countries clearly underline the need for a continued growth of the AFIC as a community of experts beyond the current workshop-themed model. These improvements can be clustered into five different initiatives: (1) Creation of AFIC information sharing platform; (2) Solidifying shared ownership of the AFIC; (3) Building of risk analysis capacity of AFIC countries; (4) Enhancing of the AFIC’s visibility; and (5) Providing technical support for joint risk analysis purposes.

Frontex is willing to continue to provide organisational, expert and financial support for the AFIC in this respect, provided that Frontex Management Board endorses this approach and allocates appropriate resources. Likewise, coordination with and support from the relevant EU institutions (European Commission, European External Action Service) is essential for the further development of the AFIC.
1. Introduction and methodology

1.1. Introduction

The Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community was set up in 2010 to provide a framework for regular knowledge and intelligence sharing in the field of border security between Frontex and African countries. The concept of this collaboration was broadly based on the model of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and the two already established regional risk analysis networks (the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network – WB-RAN and the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network – EB-RAN).

A conference initiating this new network with selected African states from West and North Africa, as well as Immigration Liaison Officers based in some African countries, took place in Madrid in April 2010. Participants of the conference agreed to name the network the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community, in short the AFIC.

Frontex organised two additional events in 2011: a workshop aiming at familiarising African delegates with Frontex and especially with the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit, and a meeting also involving EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries. Encouraged by the results achieved within the AFIC in 2011, the community decided that the time was right in 2012 for the first AFIC Joint Report. In April 2012, Frontex organised a workshop in Warsaw, where an agreement was reached on the topics, the scope and the reporting deadlines for the first AFIC Joint Report. The year’s work culminated in the AFIC Annual Conference in Lisbon in November 2012. The conference was used to launch the AFIC Joint Report 2012 and was opened to a wider audience, which also included representatives from relevant international organisations active in the African continent (the African Union and the Arab Maghreb Union).

Following the positive experiences of 2012, further joint activities of the AFIC were organised in 2013 with two workshops and the production of a joint report followed by an annual conference that was held in November 2013 in Warsaw. The AFIC Annual Conference in 2013 was attended by representatives of 12 AFIC countries as well as ECOWAS, European External Action Service, EUCAP Sahel and EUBAM Libya.

1.2. Methodology

In 2014, joint activities of the AFIC were largely modelled on the successes of 2012 and 2013 (two workshops, one annual conference and one joint report). The year’s first workshop held in Warsaw in May tackled the issues of document fraud, the current situation on the routes between Africa and the EU as well as regional security in Africa. The workshop was designed as a structured brainstorming session with all AFIC countries actively participating in the discussions. As was the case in 2013, AFIC experts decided to adopt a thematic approach for the annual AFIC Joint Report.

Based on the results of the workshop, a Request for Information (RFI) was delivered to AFIC countries in order to gather more data and cover possible intelligence gaps on the chosen topics. Twelve replies were received, which were then incorporated into the third joint report.

Responding to proposals by AFIC countries, analysis and information used for this report
is much less EU-centred and data-driven. Instead, it mainly relies on the contributions from African partners only complemented by information available to Frontex, focusing on the situation in Africa itself. Open-source information was also used to provide a context for the themes described in this report.

The first workshop of 2014 in Warsaw also included a visit to Terespol border-crossing point at the Polish-Belarusian land border. The full-day visit hosted by the Polish Border Guard included a tour of the border-crossing point with demonstrations of border checks, search for contraband in vehicles, the railway

Figure 1. Nigeria, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are the most populous AFIC countries

General map of AFIC countries with their respective populations and border length indicated. Please note that the distinction between North AFIC countries (AFIC North) and sub-Saharan AFIC countries (AFIC Sub) is made for purely analytical purposes to facilitate the recognition and analysis of different migration patterns in North and sub-Saharan Africa. While Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt are listed as AFIC countries, they are not participating in the work of the community.

Source: CIA World Factbook, July 2013
crossing-point and, as the highlight of the day, a visit to the bridge that links the two countries to observe border surveillance and border infrastructure.

Frontex also organised a meeting with EU Member States’ Immigration Liaison Officers posted in Africa, where issues were discussed with a view of feeding into this report.

The second workshop in Lisbon served the purpose of discussing the draft and improving its quality by adding additional and more specific information from AFIC countries. The participants were briefed on the concept for the October 2014 AFIC Senior Officials Risk Analysis Meeting and were asked to provide their views on the subject, especially regarding the proposals for further development of the AFIC as proposed by Frontex in the last chapter of the present report. In addition, the annex of this report includes a sample of the so-called ‘threat-scanning exercise’ that, if duly performed by all AFIC partners,
Figure 3. The Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)

CIRAM, the key methodology used for risk analysis in EU border management context, adopts a management approach to risk analysis that defines risk as a function of threat, vulnerability and impact. This facilitates the role of risk analysis as a key tool in ensuring the optimal allocation of resources within constraints of budget, staff and efficiency of equipment.

According to the model, a ‘threat’ is a force or pressure acting upon the external borders that is characterised by both its magnitude and likelihood; ‘vulnerability’ is defined as the capacity of a system to mitigate the threat; and ‘impact’ is determined as the potential consequences of the threat.

can be used as a good tool for future focus of the AFIC.

The final report was presented during AFIC Senior Officials Risk Analysis Meeting that was held in Warsaw on the margins of the International Border Police Conference organised by Frontex on 20–22 October 2014. The meeting’s aim was to bring AFIC activities and deliverables closer to the policy cycle discussions in Africa and Europe. Furthermore, the meeting was used to debate how to strengthen and further develop the AFIC.

Provisional application of the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM)

This third annual AFIC Joint Report introduces the idea of risk as defined by the CIRAM. This is largely done by adding simple risk summary tables at the beginning of relevant chapters.
2. Irregular migration flows between Africa and Europe – update on 2013

Table 1. Risk summary table

| Threat: illegal border-crossing, document fraud, trafficking in human beings (THB) |
|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Vulnerabilities: | porous borders in Africa, high availability of boats in North Africa, lack of sufficient institutional capacity in Libya and Egypt, poor state of civil registries in several African countries, insufficient security of blank documents, lack of appropriate training for border officers, language barriers |
| Impact:           | loss of life, inhumane treatment of migrants along the route, extensive unofficial economy generating profits for smuggling organisations, internal security |

2.1. Introduction

As stated in AFIC Joint Report of 2013, the field of migratory movements is wide and heavily researched with no single theory of migration yet able to fully describe or explain them. Therefore, for the purposes of this report it is safe to assume that large and rather stable pools of would-be migrants exist in several regions of Africa.

As the title suggests, this chapter discusses irregular migratory flows as they occur in the specific geographic context of Europe and Africa through well-documented routes spanning the wider Atlantic and Mediterranean region. It is worth stressing that the chapter does not attempt to answer questions as to why people want to migrate in the first place but rather dwells on issues related to how people move, where they stop or attempt an irregular entry (either in Africa or in Europe), what methods they use for irregular movements, and what kind of hazards they are exposed to during their journey.

By and large, this chapter describes the three main threats, indicated in the risk summary table (Tab. 1), i.e. illegal border-crossing, document fraud and trafficking in human beings.

In addition, this chapter – while ambitious in its aim to highlight the main developments – does not presume to provide a complete picture regarding the mentioned threats. Our analysis is inevitably partial but unique as it largely relies on information provided by AFIC countries and builds upon information or intelligence gained in the context of different Frontex Joint Operations.

Departing somewhat from the approach adopted in the last two AFIC Joint Reports and responding to proposals from AFIC countries, this chapter is driven much less by EU Member States’ and Frontex Joint Operation detection data. Instead, it focuses on describing trends in broad strokes and on providing contextual information based on qualitative information available to AFIC countries and Frontex.

2.2. Central Mediterranean

There was a sharp increase in the number of irregular migrants detected and/or rescued in the Central Mediterranean region. A staggering 114,000 arrivals during the first eight months of 2014 represented almost a sixfold increase compared to the same period of 2013. A large majority of all migrants transited...
through Libya before attempting their maritime crossing towards the EU. Compared to the other two major transit and departure countries (Egypt and Turkey), Libya accounted for up to ten times more migrants departing from its shores. In other words, nine out of ten departures in the Central Mediterranean during 2014 so far have been from Libya.

There are indications to suggest that the overall yearly number of arrivals during 2014 in the Central Mediterranean could surpass 150 000 (absolute historical record). This is due to the following reasons:

- The presence of Italian maritime assets (deployed within the framework of the operation Mare Nostrum) in close proximity of the Libyan coast, in addition to the participation of civilian vessels in the rescue of migrants, is often exploited by smugglers.

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**Figure 4.** The single largest change compared to 2013 is the enormous increase of maritime irregular entries in the Central Mediterranean, where numbers are likely to surpass 150 000 by the end of 2014 if the current trend continues.

Illegal border-crossings at different irregular migration routes during the first eight months of 2014 compared to the same period last year.

**Figure 5.** Most irregular migrants in the Central Mediterranean during 2014 arrived in the EU after having departed from Libya.

Shares of the top five most detected nationalities for illegal border-crossing in the Central Mediterranean during the first seven months of 2014.
gling networks. For instance, migrants are assured by facilitation networks in Libya that they will be rescued soon after departure by the Italian authorities or civil vessels.

A large number of migrants from sub-Saharan and Horn of African countries as well as Syrian nationals are currently staying in coastal areas of Libya. Increasing instability in Libya (see Chapter 3. Regional security risks). Central government in Libya is struggling to provide basic security across the country. The Libyan authorities also lack the ability to consistently prevent the departure of boats from their coastline. In addition, credible reporting suggests high levels of corruption and the fact that Libyan law-enforcement authorities often ‘turn a blind eye’.

It seems that the only self-limiting factors currently in place in Libya are the availability of boats and the ability of migrants to pay for the crossing.

Zuwarah, Sabratha, Tripoli, Garabulli and Al Khums continue to be the main departure points from Libya. In the case of departures from Egypt, the main points are Alexandria and, to a lesser extent, Port Said.

The fees collected by facilitator for the maritime crossing from Libya vary depending on the type of boats and services offered. For example, the price for a spot on larger fishing vessels is higher compared to rubber boats. Likewise, the price goes up if migrants are given life vests, GPS devices and satellite phones.

Syrians tend to pay more compared to persons from the Horn of Africa or sub-Saharan parts of the continent. On average, the price for the maritime crossing from Libya is around USD 1,300, but it rises to about USD 3,000 for departures from Egypt.

Among the main known nationalities detected in 2014, Eritreans are clearly in the lead with a 26% share of the total. The flow started to increase exponentially during the first four months of 2014 (from 40 in January to 5,711 in April) before stabilising at very high levels (averaging over 5,400 detections per month).

Other important nationalities detected in the Central Mediterranean include Syrians, Malians and, to a lesser extent, also Nigerians and Gambians.

Eritreans

Eritrea is one of the top countries in the world when it comes to the scale of its citizens’ exodus. According to the International Crisis Group, the current very high levels are unsustainable.

Most Eritreans flee to evade compulsory, oppressive and indefinite military service in the country. They leave the country illegally, with-
out obtaining the required exit permit/visa, which are difficult to obtain from authorities. This situation has led to the so-called ‘refugee racket’. When irregular travellers from Eritrea are detained by Rashida paramilitary groups operating at the border with Sudan, a ransom is paid by their families for their release. The money allegedly trickles back to members of the Eritrean Defence Forces.

Many Eritreans cross the border with Sudan or Ethiopia on foot and in a clandestine manner, as the punishment for ‘illegal’ departure from Eritrea is severe. Before reaching Khartoum, Eritreans usually travel to the town of Kassala. Once in Kassala, they try to find their way to Khartoum by avoiding refugee camps in Shagarab due to the high risk of being kidnapped there.

The facilitation networks in Khartoum transport migrants mainly towards Libya, where Ajdabiya seems to be an important transit point. This transportation is done either directly across the Libyan border or by transiting Egypt.

**Syrians**

The vast majority of Syrian migrants continue to arrive from Libya (90%), followed by those coming from Egypt (8%), Tunisia (1%) and Turkey (1%).

A high number of Syrian nationals enter Libya through Algeria. They arrive in Algeria through air routes from Beirut (Lebanon), Istanbul (Turkey) or Amman (Jordan) to reach Algiers (Algeria). Since May 2014 the number of Syrians using the air routes from Lebanon, Amman or Istanbul to Algiers and then being facilitated by land through Ourgla and Deb Deb (Algeria) to Gadamis and the Zuwwara (Libya) has considerably increased. Syrians opt for this route due to the fact that they do not need visas to enter Algeria.

Migrants tend to use the same facilitation networks in Algeria that were previously used by their relatives or friends who had successfully reached the EU. The final price paid by migrants using this route varies from USD 5 500 to 7 000. The fee includes airline tickets, facilitation though Algeria and Libya, and then transfer to Italy.

**Gambians**

Most Gambians arriving in Italy during 2014 had previously been living in Libya for extended periods. They worked in construction, gardening and domestic help. Most left the Gambia legally to Senegal and then went to Mali and Niger with official documents (ID cards, driving licenses and passports) following a route through ECOWAS member states.

From the interviews with migrants it was established that there are more than 1 000 Gambians in Gargaresh district areas of Tripoli stranded in four big compounds waiting to be smuggled across the Mediterranean Sea.

As confirmed by the majority of interviewed Gambians, these compounds are under the control of Libyan personnel linked to the Libyan military.

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*Eritrea: Ending the Exodus? – International Crisis Group, August 2014*
Smuggling networks adapting to operational activities in the Central Mediterranean

Given the increased search and rescue capability in the Central Mediterranean, smugglers are increasingly filling their boats beyond capacity. They are also equipping the boats with less fuel, water, and food, given that journey times from Libya have been significantly reduced. Boats are frequently intercepted by the assets of the operation Mare Nostrum only 10 hours after their departure from Libya.

Overcrowded boats departing from Libya (and, to a lesser extent, from Egypt) have become a significant problem during 2014. Compared to the situation in 2013, there was an almost threefold increase in the average number of people crammed onto one boat.

The average number of people on steel boats in particular rose by more than ten times to almost 400, while other types of boats saw less pronounced, yet still significant, increases.

These changes are caused by several factors among which the following need to be highlighted:

- Facilitators strive to maximise their profits. More migrants per boat means a higher profit margin given that boats are purchased for one journey and cannot be easily reused;
- More assets deployed to rescue people at sea (Mare Nostrum, JO Hermes 2014) led to more willingness to overcrowd the boats given that the likelihood of rescue has increased;
- With the increased supply side (more places available on boats) and reduced prices, more migrants are willing to make the journey to Libya or decide to leave the country if they had been staying there for extended periods.

Frontex intelligence shows that in many cases these migrants are forced to wait in safe houses for up to a few weeks. The reason behind this sometimes prolonged waiting time is for organisers/smugglers to assemble large enough groups and thus maximise their profit margins. In addition, migrants often want to avoid being arrested by either police or one of around 500 militias operating in Libya (see Section 2.5. Humanitarian impact).

Given the current average price for the sea crossing from Libya to Italy (around USD 1 300), some estimates suggest that smugglers can thus generate up to USD 150 000 of pure profit per boat after all costs are de-
ducted (fuel, boat, satellite phone, water and food). In terms of overall revenues generated by this smuggling business in Libya (the number of detected migrants multiplied by USD 1300), smuggling organisations in Libya have already generated close to USD 100 million in 2014.

2.3. Western Mediterranean

There were no significant changes in migratory routes linking Morocco or Algeria with the EU. As indicated by the map in Figure 9, most of the pressure was observed at the land border between Ceuta or Melilla and Morocco, where attempts to storm the fences

Figure 8. Comparison between 2013 and 2014 clearly shows a significant increase in the average number of people per boat

Average number of migrants per different type of boat in 2014 compared to 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wooden boat</th>
<th>Rubber boat</th>
<th>Steel boat</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JORA as of August 2014

Figure 9. There was an increasing number of irregular migrants arriving in Spain from Morocco or Algeria in the first seven months of 2014 detected compared to the same period in 2013

Detections of illegal border-crossing in the Western Mediterranean from 1 January to 31 July 2014 by top five nationalities and type of border compared with the same period in 2013

Source: FRAN and JORA as of 15 August 2014
have continued in earnest. These developments occurred in spite of an important reform of Morocco’s migration policy and its new regularisation programme aimed primarily at sub-Saharan migrants.

There have been numerous attempts to storm the fences of Melilla and Ceuta during 2014. In some instances, up to 600 people were able to reach the fence, causing severe strain on the authorities in Morocco and Spain. For example, only in the case of one such incident that happened in broad daylight were the Moroccan authorities able to prevent around 200 persons from reaching the fence.

These attempts tend to be massive due to the fact that only by overwhelming the authorities through high numbers can migrants somehow hope to enter the Spanish territory. The massive storming is not organised, it does not cost any money and can therefore be repeated many times. It usually occurs whenever migrants think that border patrols are less numerous than normal.

**New security measures in Melilla and Ceuta**

In order to deter massive attempts that are usually very aggressive and dangerous for both migrants and Moroccan or Spanish officers trying to prevent illegal entry, a new anti-climb measure was installed between April and June 2014. It works by preventing migrants from getting a firm grip on the outer fence when they try to climb over it.

The Spanish authorities have also installed night-vision and infrared camera systems, deployed a helicopter with Spanish crew for air surveillance of the area and have constructed three watchtowers in the course of June 2014.

Figure 10. **Schematic diagram of border fence in Ceuta and Melilla**

Source: Frontex, 2014
Main nationalities

The main nationalities of migrants trying to illegally enter the EU from Morocco were Malians, Cameroonian and Guineans. In fact, a large majority of all detected irregular migrants (either by Morocco or by Spain) were from sub-Saharan Africa.

The number of Senegalese migrants is probably underestimated since they are presumed to be claiming to be from Chad or Cameroon.

Following many storming attempts throughout the summer of 2014, Moroccan authorities have carried out a police operation in a makeshift camp where some 1,000 irregular migrants were living as they waited to storm the border fence that separates Morocco and Spain, according to a human rights group in Melilla. The operation on Mount Gurugú, about 10 km away from the Spanish enclave of Melilla, began in the second half of August 2014 and was carried out over several days. According to migrants’ statements, they were transported to Fez and Rabat and later released.

Many migrants are believed to be making the 550 km journey back to Mount Gurugú; however, this costs money and takes some time. Assaults on the Melilla fence are likely to be reduced in the short term as a consequence of Morocco’s actions on Mount Gurugú.

Sea crossing from Morocco to Spain

Apart from a moderately increasing trend compared to 2013, there were no major changes in the irregular maritime movements across the Straits of Gibraltar during 2014. Namely, there are no changes in the setup of the trips, in the sense that the prices of the boats are the same as reported earlier (EUR ~200/person) and the same type of inflatable boats are used. These are boats of either 255 kg capacity with 6–7 persons on board or of 400 kg capacity carrying 10–11 persons. Departures usually take place from Tangier, Tetouan and Nador.

Both Morocco’s Royal Navy and Spanish SASEMAR often conduct search and rescue missions to save people on these boats trying to reach the Spanish coasts. According to Moroccan authorities, from the beginning of 2014 (until June 2014), they were able to intercept some 80 vessels having on board more than 900 sub-Saharan, composed of several African nations, including 68 women, 22 children and 6 infants.

In the face of increasing difficulties associated with sea crossing to the European continent or attempts to scale the Melilla fence, migrants resort to quite unusual modi oper-
and means of transport in the hope of maximising their chance of success, as illustrated with the following examples:

1. The Spanish Civil Guard attempted to intercept a jet ski spotted off the coast of Melilla. Upon seeing the security forces, the driver, a Moroccan, performed a series of manoeuvres, which helped him reach the Moroccan port of Beni Enzar and flee leaving his craft behind. When the officers in pursuit approached the jet ski, they could hear some screaming from the inside. Upon search, they discovered small compartments where two sub-Saharan migrants were hiding. In line with the current legislation, the migrants were handed over to the Moroccan authorities since they were detected in the area under their control. This was the first incident when such modus operandi was observed.

2. Two other migrants were found hiding behind the engines of ferries connecting the two continents. This hiding place was highly dangerous as the migrants exposed themselves to a significant risk of drowning or being fatally injured by the propellers.

3. The Spanish authorities at the border in Melilla detected a young Ghanaian hiding in the frame of the front seat of a car registered in Morocco. The clandestine entrant, aged 20, was found disguised as a car seat, trying in this way to illegally enter the Spanish enclave with the help of two Moroccans. He was detected when Spanish customs officers asked the occupants of the vehicle to get out of the car for regular check but then noticed suspicious holes in the headrest of the front passenger seat.

2.4. Irregular land and air migratory routes in Africa

- **Morocco**

Information from Morocco indicates that the main entry point for many sub-Saharan Africans that want to illegally move to the EU is concentrated on the Moroccan-Algerian land border. However, during 2014 routing through Algeria became more difficult due to changes related to the border management in Algeria (see box).

With regards to air routes, Casablanca remains the most popular air hub for sub-Saharan migrants (frequently detected in possession of false documents), given the extensive route network of Royal Air Morocco with the rest of Africa. Casablanca airport is the busiest airport in Morocco with more that 7 million passengers annually.

- **Mali**

According to Malian authorities, the most common routes include both maritime routes from Mauritania to the Canary Islands and land routes via Algeria to Morocco or Libya. Kayes and Gao are the main exit points for irregular migrants.
With a more stable security situation in the north (see under Regional security risks), routing of migrants through Gao for Niger and Algeria has resumed somewhat. Malian authorities stress that most of this flow is not regular given that there is only one regular border crossing between Mali and Niger (Labbezanga). Unofficial border crossing points and routes are beyond the control of Malian authorities. They remain under strong dominance of different armed groups. Areas between Anefis and Kidal are particularly known hubs where smugglers of irregular migrants to Libya via Niger and Algeria as well as for drug traffickers congregate.

With the return of more stability, the Government of Mali together with humanitarian organisations are taking part in the repatriation of previously displaced persons and refugees. The most recent cases of repatriation were recorded from Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and the Central African Republic (CAR). With regards to Libya, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, this involved the deportations of Malian citizens due to their illegal residence. Concerning the CAR, the Malians were repatriated following governmental decisions in light of violations of the law.

Examples of the most recent voluntary returns as reported by Malian participants in AFIC include:

Gao: 124 households from the regions of Sikasso, Koutiala. Nearly 100 households came from Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Algeria;

Timbuktu: Return of more than five thousand (5 000) Malians from Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Algeria;

Mopti: 30 households returned the regions Douentza, Ténenkou and others.

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**Increasing militarisation of Algerian borders**

In response to a growing threat of terrorism (see Chapter 3. Regional security risks), Algeria has been closing border crossings with Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya and turning border areas into military zones, where access is denied without a security permit from the Ministry of Defence.

The ground forces and the gendarmerie units in the southern border regions of Algeria are using modern, recently acquired equipment.

- **Niger**

In Niger, which is a transit country, two main routes towards Algeria and Libya run through Agadez. Transit through Agadez is largely due to a mixture of geographical, historical, cultural and sometimes religious reasons.

Well-developed facilitation networks, corruption, as well as a lack of control over money flows in the region are regarded as the main pull factors. Lack of border controls with Chad intensifies the migration flow through Niger.

Authorities in Niger estimate that roughly 80% of migrants transiting Niger move to Libya and the rest are targeting Algeria. According to the National Police of Niger, moving towards Libya or Algeria follows these main routes:

- Agadez/Arlit/Assamaka/Inguezzam/Tamanrasset – the main road, which is less risky;

- Agadez/Arlit/Inguezzam/Tamanrasset (route bypasses the police station);

- Agadez/Arlit/Tchingalen/Bouss Adrar/Tchibarakaten, where Libyan and Algerian facilitators offer packages to Janett (Algeria) or Gath (Libya). Migrants are housed in places called ‘garage’ that belong to the facilitators. Crossing to Algeria
or Libya is done in small groups and preferably overnight in order to avoid possible checkpoints;
- Agadez/Ténéré tree/Dirkou/Siguidine/Dao Timi/Madama/Toumo/Gatrone/Oubari/Sabahaon. Starting from Siguidine, the route is very dangerous and migrants face a high risk of dying in the desert given the many cases of drivers simply abandoning migrants;
- Agadez/Dirkou/Siguidine/Chirfa/Djadjo/Ja-net in Algeria. This route is also very dangerous since most of the journey is done at night with only stars showing the way.

Border control authorities of Niger reported to Frontex that during the period between June and August 2014 they were able to confiscate more than 100 off-road vehicles used by local facilitators to transport migrants from Agadez region across the border to Libya. In addition, 29 facilitators were arrested and 18 safe houses were dismantled in Agadez.

Regardless of this relative success, Niger authorities openly admit that they do not know what to do with the migrants after they are identified. They cannot return them, their presence in Niger is legal (ECOWAS free movement protocol) and migrants are subsequently released immediately. Migrants later simply reattempt to cross into Libya.

Facilitators or persons providing transport into Libya or place to stay in safe houses are usually local people with the organisers often residing in countries of origin of migrants. These organisers have connections in Niger, Libya and the EU.

The price for fully loaded off-road vehicle trip to Libya is around EUR 5 000. There are up to 30 migrants (extreme cases) in each vehicle bringing down the cost per each migrant to EUR 15–50.

Authorities in Niger estimate that around 1 000 to 1 500 sub-Saharan migrants enter Libya illegally each week. These Africans arrive in Niger legally (ECOWAS travel documents) using several direct bus lines that are linking Senegal or Ghana with Agadez in Niger.

Nevertheless, authorities in Niger started to notice that a lot of sub-Saharan are now returning from Libya back to Niger. In addition, other nationalities (e.g. Pakistanis) are also using this route to escape the chaos in Libya.

The information on returning sub-Saharan was corroborated by Ghanaian authorities, which noticed an increase in returning Ghanaians in the recent period. This would further confirm the dire situation of migrants in Libya (see Section 3.4. Threatened state stability of Libya).

- Benin

Information provided by Benin, pointed out new migratory routes from Cotonou on Royal Air Maroc flights via Casablanca to various EU countries such as Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Greece. The majority of migrants transiting Benin originated from

Figure 13. Cycle of multiple illegal border-crossings by the same person in Niger
Congo, Cameroon, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. Transfer to Europe is arranged by facilitation networks organising all formalities (such as visas or tickets), thus on the way to the EU migrants are usually in possession of authentic documents belonging to other persons already settled in one of the EU Member States.

Not surprisingly, air connections from Benin via Niger or Nigeria to Istanbul are frequently used as a stage of the migration route to the EU. It cannot be excluded that direct flights from Benin to Istanbul will further increase the migration flow towards the EU via Turkey.

Senegal

Migrants from Senegal head for Morocco overland, by sea or by air. The most frequently used land routes to Libya lead through Mali and Niger. However, a pattern of using charter flights from Casablanca to small European airports has also been identified. Documents used during the trip to Europe are reported to be provided by facilitators at the airport of Agadir and Casablanca.

Importantly, after three years of calm, since October 2013 new attempts of departures by sea have been observed in Senegal. The Senegalese authorities prevented departures of some wooden boats. As reported by Senegal, the reappearance of sea routes remains a source of concern for the authorities.

Another crucial concern reported by Senegal is related to the Southern part of the country – the region of Casamance that is separated from the rest of Senegal by the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau with an outlet to the Atlantic Ocean. Its rain forests and thick vegetation make this terrain inaccessible and hamper any monitoring by the authorities. This region has also been experiencing armed rebellion for 32 years driven by a struggle for independence.

Smugglers tend to exploit this in order to transfer migrants by sea towards the Canary Islands. Discovery of boats, fuel reserves
and food, life jackets or GPS devices in some of the dismantled locations confirms a well-functioning smuggling network in the region.

2.5. Humanitarian impact

Migrants from Horn of Africa and sub-Saharan regions of Africa are often maltreated at different stages of their journeys. They also face significant risk of dying during the desert crossing or when making the sea crossing from northern Africa towards the EU. Migrants’ vulnerability during their migration from Africa to Europe is therefore considered to be very high.

According to what migrants state during their interviews upon arrival to the EU, maltreatment can range from facilitators abandoning them in desert environments to forced and organised abuse by the authorities and different militias in Libya.

In Libya, sub-Saharan Africans in particular are at constant risk of exploitation, arrest and arbitrary detention as migrants can be detained and released (for a fee) several times. Discussion during the AFIC/ILO meeting in Madrid (June 2014), indicated a clear involvement of different militias in arbitrary detentions given that they have de facto control over several detention centres in Libya. There are also strong indications (based on open source reporting and interviews with migrants) that Libyan police often charge money for release from detention.

During the desert crossing the main hazard comes from the fact that drivers often avoid safer or more frequented roads in order to avoid checkpoints. Furthermore, there were several reported cases where migrants were simply abandoned by the organisers or taken hostage by different armed groups operating in vast desert areas in the Sahel.

But probably the most dangerous leg of the journey still remains the sea crossing. Authorities in the EU are trying to reduce the loss of life at sea. Up until the end of August 2014 more than 100,000 people were rescued in the context of search and rescue activities in the Central Mediterranean alone. These mammoth efforts are best exempli-
fied by developments on 18 July 2014 when authorities rescued 3,500 people in a span of only 48 hours.

While additional resources of the Mare Nostrum operation and efforts by Frontex in the context of JO Hermes 2014 have prevented many potential new tragedies, figures available to Frontex suggest at least 143 confirmed deaths during the crossing in the first eight months of 2014. This represents a sharp increase compared to the same period in 2013 when only 8 confirmed fatalities were reported.

In fact, when the confirmed death toll is measured against the overall flow of people and a casualty ratio is calculated, it becomes clear that maritime crossing during 2014 has become inherently more dangerous. More precisely, during the first eight months of 2014 there was 1.4 confirmed deaths for every 1,000 people that arrived to Italy and Malta, compared to 0.4 confirmed death for every 1,000 person during the same period in 2013. This would mean that despite enormous collective efforts by

**Nigerian male – 26 years old**

‘We went from Nigeria to Niger in trucks and pick-ups and from Niger to Algeria on foot. Crossing the desert without any food or water in three days was very hard.’

Source: JO Indalo
the authorities in the EU, the risk for loss of life at sea during maritime crossings in the Central Mediterranean during 2014 has in fact increased.

This assumption is echoed by a UNHCR estimation as of 15 September 2014* that puts the death toll from sinking vessels on the Mediterranean to almost 2,500, including some 2,200 since June 2014 alone. As UNHCR states, the relatively high death toll is despite the enormous efforts made by the relevant EU authorities and the constant help lent by private vessels.

By mid-September 2014, an additional 700 people may have drowned in shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, bringing the death toll in 2014 to almost 3,000 according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In one terrible incident alone, as many as 500 migrants are believed to have died after traffickers rammed their ship off Malta’s coast, an event that only came to light after testimonies from two survivors.

2.6. Document fraud

Introduction

Abuse of travel documents is a major concern for all AFIC countries. Information provided in the context of AFIC joint risk analysis suggests that abuse of authentic documents seemed to be the main issue. This is often facilitated through the main weak points in the document security chain – civil registries and corruption.

The main reason behind abuse of authentic travel documents is linked to the increasing sophistication of security features in modern biometric passports which makes forgery more difficult. By fraudulently using authentic documents, would-be migrants aim to gain entry to transit or destination countries without the need to obtain a visa. For example, ECOWAS IDs are used to move through the region, while EU Member State passports are often required to attempt entry into the EU.
Saving lives at sea by deterring departures – example of Australian Sovereign Borders Operation

The existence of Australian territory (Christmas Island) close to Indonesian territory makes arrival by sea a viable option.

In the absence of effective policies to prevent departures, or to provide alternative options to would-be migrants and refugees, arrivals to Australia by maritime route reached 37,000 persons in the two year period between 2012 and 2013.

Tragically, over 1,000 deaths have resulted from this inherently unsafe and disorderly movement of people.

In response, the new Australian government launched Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) on 18 September 2013. OSB is military-led and aimed at preventing people from arriving by sea to Australian territory to seek asylum. Arriving to Australian soil is a clear pull factor that encourages more to attempt the journey. OSB includes a Regional Deterrence Framework (see below for details) with interventions in source and transit countries and at sea. Implementation is driven by a Joint Agency Task Force headed by an Australian three star general. Broadly speaking, the policy comprises of four main elements:

1. the external disruption and deterrence measures with regional partners;
2. the detection and interception of Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels (SIEVs) and the safe transfer of passengers to a location outside Australia;
3. the detention of SIEV passengers in third countries and assessment of their claims to determine whether or not they are refugees (Regional Resettlement Arrangement with Papua New Guinea);
4. the return of SIEV passengers who are not refugees to their country of origin.

For those found to be refugees, resettlement in a third country is the primary option. As a last resort, resettlement in Australia is administered through Temporary Humanitarian Concern Visas (THCV) only.
Regional Deterrence Framework (RDF) of the operation

RDF aimed to engage with other countries in the region, particularly Indonesia, to prevent asylum seeker vessels leaving for Australia. The framework includes (inter alia):
(a) AUD 67 million to support joint operations with Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Malaysia;
(b) AUD 27 million to prevent loss of life at sea by increasing aerial surveillance and AUD 71 million to boost the search and rescue (SAR) response capability of the Indonesian authorities within their SAR zone;
(c) boat buy-back scheme that provides an incentive for owners of dangerously unsafe boats to sell their boats to government officials in Indonesia rather than to people smugglers;
(d) support for informants in local communities, whose role is to provide intelligence information to the Indonesian National Police on people smuggling operations;
(e) bounty payments (only in exceptional circumstances) for the provision of information resulting in significant disruptions or arrests leading to convictions.

OSB Structure

Operation Sovereign Borders operates as a Joint Agency Taskforce (JATF), with the support of a range of government agencies, organised as three operational task groups:
1. Detection, Interception and Transfer Task Group – led by the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
2. Disruption and Deterrence Task Group – led by the Australian Federal Police
3. Offshore Detention and Returns Task Group – led by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection

Conclusions

While criticised by different human rights organisations, OSB has been extremely successful in preventing departures and associated loss of life at sea. Namely, up until August 2014 only 157 persons were intercepted at sea close to Christmas Island. The Australian approach therefore seems to be effective and there are many similarities with the situation in the wider Mediterranean region.

Abuse of travel documents as reported by AFIC countries

The main problem in Mali is the abuse of authentic documents – both by Malians and other nationalities. This is largely due to the fact that the process of issuing a Malian passport is not secure. Namely, it is relatively easy to fabricate a birth certificate that then serves as a basis for an ID, which in turn is used to obtain a passport. The system is particularly vulnerable also because:
(a) Malian nationals can be issued several documents, including with name changes.
(b) Foreigners (such as Nigerians) are trying to get Malian passports through fake birth certificates in order to get visa-free access to Morocco or to cover their criminal past by obtaining a new identity.

Mauritania has observed Syrians using authentic Turkish passports. Mauritanian authentic documents are also abused. For example, CAR nationals are trying to get Mauritanian documents in order to enter Morocco without a visa.

In Niger, the described abuse of authentic documents is even easier as the languages and tribes are similar in the regions surrounding Niger. Language checks are thus difficult in determining the real country of origin.
when a person provides a fake birth certificate in Niger.

There are two main types of document fraud usually detected at Cameroonian borders. The first one is the so-called impostor method whereby a person is using genuine document as a look-alike. The second type of fraud is associated with identity fraud which usually involves falsification or counterfeiting of breeder documents (e.g. birth certificates).

It should be noted, however, that since Cameroon transitioned to biometric passport, document fraud has been experiencing a downward trend in the order of 50%. Indeed, the impostor method, which was the most frequent, fell sharply as new passports are more difficult to forge.

Sierra Leone reports that corruption within the Immigration Department is also an issue to consider when tackling authentic travel documents abuse. A few cases have been detected of corrupt officials colluding with criminals to obtain passports and change the names on them to facilitate prospective migrants’ movements. There is also the Emergency Travel Certificate (ETC) that is issued by the government to be issued to citizens along the border areas who cannot easily access the capital in order to purchase a passport. However, some corrupt border officials were detected selling an ETC to prospective migrants.

Senegal reported the following main forms of document fraud: (1) a rising trend of theft of authentic Senegalese blank passports activated afterwards by thieves or facilitators, (2) fraudulent acquisition of breeder documents (false witness) serving to apply for authentic Senegalese passports by foreigners, (3) corruption of embassies’ or consulates’ staff (160 blank authentic passports were detected in South Africa in April 2014).

One of the reasons for a high demand of Senegalese passports is that the nationals of this country do not need a visa to enter Morocco.

The above explains the abundance of Senegalese passports detected in the EU. According to the information possessed by the Senegalese authorities, the price of an authentic Senegalese passport varies between EUR 750 and 1 200.

The major challenge in Benin is linked to fraudulently obtained birth certificates. According to Benin authorities, Nigerian citizens – due to similar languages in their countries of origin – use the opportunity to unlawfully obtain birth certificates as Benin citizens in order to get a passport of Benin.
Reducing vulnerability of authentic travel documents

The Togolese government has taken several steps to reduce the vulnerability of its travel documents. These measures mirror measures taken by several other AFIC countries and are therefore worth describing.

The main measure includes the introduction of biometric passports and centralising the border control database. Togo still had problems with civil registry; however, new rules were introduced. Now parents have to apply for birth certificates 48 days after the birth of a child. If this is not done then the decision goes to court.

Similarly, Mali created a new unit to conduct interviews in order to prove the identity of the persons applying for birth certificates. In addition, birth certificates can only be obtained during the first 20 days after a child is born. As in the case of Togo, all late requests are dealt with by lower courts.

In Cameroon, the authorities have made the security of travel documents a priority. The new biometric passport meets all international security standards. Currently, there has not been a single case of a false Cameroonian biometric passport detected by the authorities in Cameroon. This somewhat confirms the notion that most document fraud is occurring upstream; that is, during issuing civil status documents that form the basis for biometric passports (birth certificate, marriage certificate).

Currently the main challenge of Cameroon is the digitalisation and the centralisation of civil registry. The success of this project could substantially reduce the use of forged breeder documents to obtain genuine biometric passport. However, the high cost of this project has so far prevented Cameroon from implementing it.

The Nigerian Immigration Service has adopted several measures in order to enhance the security of travel documents. These were the introduction of the electronic passport, the establishment of document fraud units in Abuja and Lagos, the establishment of a dedicated intelligence unit and the production of a booklet document called ‘passport to safe migration’ made with the support from Spain and ECOWAS, in order to provide awareness and information to prospective migrants.

Mauritania has established a National Agency for Secure documents in 2012. This agency produces all civil status documents in a secure manner and using biometric technology.

Figure 20. One of the ten false passports that were used by the Afghan group in Togo (left photo), Italian false passport used by Syrians (right photo)
Interesting cases of document fraud reported by AFIC countries

**Togo**

Authorities in Togo have also reported several cases where migrants were detected with fraudulent documents. The most interesting cases include the following:

1. A group of ten Afghans that were previously residing in Saudi Arabia were detected for using false passports from the UK. Their intention was to travel to the EU. The group was facilitated by a Pakistani network operating in the EU.
2. A group of five Syrians entered Togo with their genuine Syrian passports. They were later detected for trying to board a flight towards the EU using false Italian passports.

**Benin**

As pointed out by Benin, a network involved in the stealing of a large amount of blank original passports was dismantled by the Police Service. All blank passports were reported to be found. Main cases included e.g. apprehension of a Congolese citizen in 2013 with 83 blank passports and a Nigerian national with 21 Nigerian passports with false Danish visas.

**Morocco**

Morocco reported that the use of genuine Moroccan passports by impostors was frequent among migrants attempting to enter Ceuta and Melilla. Sub-Saharan migrants were also detected to be in possession of original passports with fake visas. As an example, the latest detection at the border check point of Marrakech airport revealed an Ivorian migrant in possession of a Côte d’Ivoire passport with a false Schengen visa and two entry and exit stamps of Paris Orly airport. The most often falsified documents detected in Morocco are French, Belgian, Spanish and Italian.

**Nigeria**

Concerning document fraud, Nigeria made reference to one case of a women exiting towards Canada with an authentic Canadian passport at the International Airport of Abuja. She was travelling as an impostor (look-alike method).
2.7. Trafficking in human beings

Introduction

Several AFIC countries reported that THB represents a serious concern. In Nigeria for example, victims are being trafficked both domestically and outside the country. They have been trafficked throughout West Africa to countries such as Ghana and the Central African Republic and there are extensive human-trafficking flows from Nigeria to Europe as Nigerian victims have been reported in at least 20 European countries. Additionally, children from Benin, Ghana, and Togo are trafficked into Nigeria and forced to work in labour-intensive industries.

Common types of THB as reported by AFIC countries

When describing different types of THB, the list below provides a good summary of the most prevalent ones in AFIC countries:

1. Trafficking in children – children who are trafficked for sexual purposes, illegal adoption, child labour (e.g. domestic work, baby-sitters/nannies, begging, criminal activities like selling drugs, etc.), and participation in armed conflict – mercenaries/child soldiers, sex slaves;
2. Trafficking in men for forced labour and other exploitation – men and boys in particular are trafficked for labour exploitation in construction work, in agriculture, and also in fishing and mining industry;
3. Trafficking in women and girls for forced marriage, forced prostitution, sexual exploitation and forced labour (including domestic work, working in factories and mines and other forms of labour) – understandably, much attention has been paid to sex trafficking and available data on trafficking in persons are mainly on this aspect;

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone describes one of the most important irregular migration cases as one related to a (fake) private company that was facilitating prospective migrants towards Canada with fake visas and airline tickets.

Another interesting case in Sierra Leone was when the Portuguese embassy in Senegal requested verification of 22 Sierra Leone driving licences. It was established that 19 out of those were fake and that most of the individuals were Guinea nationals.

Cape Verde

Immigration authorities in Cape Verde detected passengers with forged passports trying to reach the EU from Praia international airport. Most of them used Swedish, Danish, Italians and Greek passports (see figure 21).

The modus operandi was always the same. All passengers were Afghans or Syrians and departed from Istanbul (Turkey). They then transit through Casablanca or Dakar before trying to reach Europe.

The qualities of the forgeries are very good and very difficult to detect. Good cooperation with Spanish and Portuguese Liaison Officers posted at the airport helped Cape Verde’s Immigration Department to verify that the passport is not valid for travel to the EU.

Mauritania

A large number of Turkish service passports were seized during an attempt of 79 Syrians in Nouakchott who wanted to go to Spain. Malian ID cards were also used by many Cameroonian nationals (and even some from non-francophone countries in Africa). Malian travel documents are popular due to the fact that they allow the holders to enter Mauritania without a visa.
3. Trafficking in human beings for organ harvesting, human body parts and tissue.

Victims are often misled to believe that they are going to be employed in a genuine business. For example, according to information provided by Sierra Leone, it has been experiencing proliferation of agencies that recruit workers to work in the Middle East. Some of the female workers who were recruited through such agencies were helped by the Sierra Leonean Embassy in Kuwait to return home after experiencing abuses, mistreatment, exploitation and slave-like conditions. The modus operandi in their case consisted of giving the women documents issued in Arabic to prevent the victims from understanding the conditions of employment.

Sometimes children are knowingly sold to the traffickers by their parents. This type of trafficking was reported by Togo and Benin and is a result of poverty, ignorance and breakdown of social norms.

According to the Trafficking in Persons Report 2013, forced child labour in Togo occurs in the agricultural sector – particularly on coffee, cocoa, and cotton farms – as well as in stone and sand quarries. Children from rural areas are brought to the capital Lome and forced to work as domestic servants, roadside vendors, and porters, or are exploited in prostitution.

Cameroon reports that the country is both a source and a destination for victims from several countries like Nigeria, Benin, Niger, Chad, Congo, the Central African Republic, Togo and Mali. It is also a transit country for victims from Gabon.

As part of the fight against trafficking in human beings, Cameroon has ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Criminalization, the Palermo Protocol and adopted Law No. 2011/024 of 14 December 2011 on the fight against smuggling and trafficking.

There are several institutions involved in the coordination in the fight against the trafficking of human beings in Cameroon. These include the Ministry of Justice, Ministry for Social Affairs, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and the Family, and the Ministry of Employment and Vocational Training.

**Control mechanisms used by traffickers**

Nigerian authorities have generated a significant amount of knowledge on how THB
occurs and what methods the traffickers use to control their victims.

In most of the cases it involves a certain level of **intimidation and threats**. Brutal violence, rape, emotional abuse, watching violence against other victims and threats of torture or murder against the victims and/or their loved ones is typical. Other methods include:

- **Lies and Deception**: used to achieve cooperation from the victim and their family. This usually involves making false promises of employment, can also pertain to hidden cameras (for blackmail) or used by traffickers to frighten victims from turning to Law enforcement when in a foreign country.

- **Debt bondage**: a very common form of control, victims transported by traffickers often incur debt that they owe to the traffickers. They are then forced to work to pay for it.

- **Unsafe, unpredictable and uncontrollable events**: Never allowing the victims to feel safe destablises them and communicates that they have no power or control over their situations and their lives are completely dependent upon their abusers.

- **Emotional abuse**: Weakening of the victims’ will through intentional deflation of his or her self-esteem with constant insults instilling feelings of worthlessness and inferiority.

- **Emotional manipulation**: Young victims are especially susceptible to the use of emotional manipulation to achieve control. Traffickers use cycles of seduction, rejection and abuse to convince victims that they actually care for them.

- **Identity control**: Traffickers often attempt to control a victim’s sense of self, especially in long term situations. Victims of sex trafficking are often given new names and appearances to demonstrate that the traffickers not only own them but also created a new person out of them for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The ultimate goal is to completely dominate, own and control the victim or make it difficult for the victim to distinguish between his or her true self and the identity created through exploitation.

- **Social isolation**: The victims are separated from their support networks and moved around from place to place to prevent them from developing relationships.

- **Traffickers fathering children of victims**: Traffickers father babies with the victims and then take them away to be cared for by the traffickers’ family so that she is bound to him.

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**Main human trafficking routes from Nigeria**
- Nigeria (Kano State) / Saudi Arabia (Middle East) (for prostitution and begging)
- Nigeria / Niger / Libya / Europe (for prostitution)
- Nigeria / Burkina Faso / Mali / Morocco / Europe (for prostitution)
- Nigeria / Morocco / Middle East (for prostitution)
- Nigeria / Côte d’Ivoire / Burkina Faso / Mali (which turned from a transit into a destination country)
- Nigeria / Cameroon / Gabon and Equatorial Guinea (domestic and agricultural labour)
- Nigeria / Algeria

Source: Nigeria’s response to Frontex RFI
3. Regional security risks

Table 2. Risk overview table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>Impact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>terrorism, sectarian violence, kidnapping for ransom and proliferation of different armed groups, proliferation of small arms and weapons</td>
<td>geographical features making it difficult to control borders, lack of means to secure borders, ineffective regional cooperation, failing state apparatus in Libya</td>
<td>economic decline, loss of life, draining of state resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1. Introduction

According to discussions during the first AFIC workshop in Warsaw (May 2014) and the African Union report from August 2014*, the situation in the Sahel is still very volatile and marked by terrorist activity, trafficking of prohibited substances, unregulated flow of people, including migrants and refugees and other cross-border crime. This situation is worsened by the porous nature of the borders and weak capacity of states to cope with it.

By and large the main security threats in the wider AFIC region remain terrorism, kidnapping for ransom, sectarian violence and proliferation of different armed terrorist groups. In addition to these threats, Libya is rapidly becoming a failed state with large areas of its territory under the rule of different militias and armed groups.

Complicating things further is the fact that peace talks aimed at ending Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali are still far from over and that activities of Boko Haram are also on the rise, especially in the border regions of northern Nigeria.

Possible regional spill-over of Boko Haram activities and growing instability in Libya are very real concerns for many AFIC countries and their partners in Europe and the US, while the prospect of stabilisation in northern Mali and reducing the operational capabilities of transnational Islamist insurgents remains important. Therefore, the main focus of this chapter will be on these issues.

3.2. Malian crisis

Mali has experienced relative calm ever since April 2013 when the number of violent incidents dropped dramatically. Whilst the rela-
Figure 24. Security risks trends as of mid-August 2014

Source: ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project) as of 9 August 2014
tive stability has been punctuated by periods of intense violence, the longer term trend seems to be towards stabilisation.

The most recent of these periods of intense violence occurred in mid-May 2014, when fighting broke out suddenly between the Military Forces of Mali and the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) during a trip by Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara to Kidal, which has historically been a hotbed of Tuareg separatism.

This very dangerous situation was defused by President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania, Current Chairman of the AU, who went to Kidal, where he obtained the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement by the armed movements that occupied the area, and the Government of Mali. Under this Agreement, the movements pledged to participate in the Inclusive Talks Peace Talks hosted by Algeria (see box).

In contrast to May 2014, Figure 25 clearly shows that the situation improved during the following month to reach the lowest level of violent events since the peak in January 2013. In addition, the violence has been progres-

**Figure 25.** Security situation in Mali has progressively improved as shown by reduced fatalities since the peak of January 2013 (bar chart). However, the improved security situation did not lead to reduction of Malian nationals arriving in the EU illegally

Monthly fatalities reported in different regions of Mali (column chart) against asylum applications and detections of illegal border-crossing of Malian nationals in the EU (line chart)

Inter-Malian Inclusive Peace Talks

Igeria initiated the Inter Malian Inclusive Peace Talks, with the support of several members of the international community: African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Chad. The Algerian authorities encouraged the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and a branch of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) to place themselves in good faith in the peace process and to ensure coherence in their respective positions. These efforts resulted in the signing on 9 June 2014, of the «Algerians Declaration».

Many observers believe that the success or failure of the negotiations rely heavily on the ability of different rebel groups to unite. In addition, the groups have very different agendas and not all of them are interested in independence or self-governance. Many are simply interested in controlling smuggling routes and receiving government resources.

According to Mali’s representative in the AFIC, should a peace deal in the northern region be agreed upon, IDPs are expected to return as well as a regular flow of migrants heading to Libya providing benefits to local traffickers.
When it comes to jihadist militants, Malian government estimates that their ability to travel in convoys of 4x4s has been severely limited, probably forcing them to move around on foot or motorbike. Many have gone into hiding or simply left Mali towards Niger, Algeria and mostly to southern Libya.

Still, as reported by Mali, the situation in the North of Mali remains tense. Recurring rocket attacks, suicide bombings and improvised explosive device detonations against Malian Armed Forces and MINUSMA* are graphic examples of these tensions.

The northern areas also still face issues related to the permanent presence of the Malian state administration, security controls

* The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support the political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilisation of the country and the implementation of the transitional roadmap.

sively located only in the two main northern towns of Kidal and Gao. This would indicate that the events in May 2014 were indeed extraordinary in nature and did not signal a systemic deterioration of security in the country.

However, the improved security situation did not lead to a reduction in the number of Malian nationals arriving in the EU illegally. Both illegal border-crossings and asylum applications of Malian nationals started to rise in 2014 in a steady pattern, therefore largely a result of other factors and not the actual security situation in the country (see more details under Irregular migration flows between Africa and Europe). When it comes to jihadist militants, Malian government estimates that their ability to travel in convoys of 4x4s has been severely limited, probably forcing them to move around on foot or motorbike. Many have gone into hiding or simply left Mali towards Niger, Algeria and mostly to southern Libya.
along the main roads, medical care or electricity. The remaining militants tend to abuse these persistent deficiencies by organising regular trafficking in arms from Libya or drugs originating from South America through the use of small aircraft. The city of Kidal, situated close to the border with Libya, remains the most favourable ‘traffic zone’ with a small airstrip in the middle of the city and one main route leading from Gao straight to the Libyan border.

Southern Libya is, according to IHS Janes, relatively safe for militants to operate in. There could be as many as 3 000 non-Libyans associated with new training camps and smuggling networks in the south, particularly around Sebha.

In light of these events, the French government launched (August 2014) a new operation named Barkhane, which will involve the deployment of 3 000 military personnel across the Sahel region, backed by six fighter jets, 20 helicopters and three drones. Operation Barkhane will bring Operation Serval to a close.

The mission creates a belt of French military presence in Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania. This operation will follow a strategic approach based on the partnership with the main countries in the Sahel-Saharan region.

This is likely to result in the re-emergence of old irregular migration routes through northern Mali but should also reduce the likelihood of migrants falling victims to extortion from different insurgents/terrorist groups.

### 3.3. Focus on Boko Haram

Nigeria is affected by multiple and sometimes overlapping internal security issues that are often marked by extreme violence. These include urban unrests, Boko Haram Islamist militancy, communal violence, violence in the Niger Delta, and Biafran secessionist claims, reviewed in turn.

The Islamist militancy of Boko Haram has been destabilising the already economically marginalised northern area. Unlike Islamist counterparts in Algeria, Mali and elsewhere, Boko Haram has explicitly rejected affiliation with Al Qaeda, and has denied involvement in the targeting of foreign interests and civilian kidnapping common to other such groups.

According to Stratfor, Boko Haram has evolved dramatically since it first appeared in 2002. It did not begin conducting militant operations until 2009. At first, the group simply attacked police stations, security patrols and prisons, freeing many incarcerated members in the process. Boko Haram has since progressed; it now attacks other targets, such as churches, using small-arms assaults, arson and improvised explosive devices.

In 2011, Boko Haram began conducting vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks and suicide attacks, such as the August 2011 incident at a UN compound in Abuja or the June
Boko Haram declares Caliphate, inspired by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria example

In July 2014, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged his support to the head of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who had previously declared himself the leader of Muslims everywhere. Boko Haram also adopted some of the Islamic State’s terror tactics and, aside from executing a great number of civilians, they have also started to behead some of their victims (one a six year-old boy).

Bringing tactics even closer to the ones of IS, on 24 August 2014, Boko Haram leader, Shekau declared an Islamic Caliphate in the predominantly Christian town of Gwoza in north-eastern part of Nigeria (Borno State). This claim came after the radicals slaughtered around 100 Christians in the town.

The caliphate declaration was rejected the next day by the Nigerian authorities who launched operations to secure the Gwoza area. Nevertheless the closeness between Boko Haram and IS can be noticed, at least regarding ideology and tactics, and this may raise concerns about more factual cooperation activities considering that both were deemed too radical to be affiliates of Al Qaeda.

Figure 27. Geographical evolution of Boko Haram violence in 2013–2014 (heat map) and increasing focus on civilian targets is clearly demonstrated by the bar chart showing number of fatalities associated with Boko Haram in the last four years.

Most notably, the numbers of casualties associated with Boko Haram violence rose significantly in 2014. In addition, Boko Haram attacks have not only increased in frequency but also in the intensity as measured by reported fatalities associated with individual events. Moreover, violence against non-combatant populations has escalated with most of the attacks now focused against civilians.

In the context of the AFIC information exchange, Nigeria reports that the threat of terrorism from Boko Haram is a serious security challenge – especially given the recent rise in violence associated with Boko Haram. Complicating things is the fact that Boko Haram is moving across the border in the North Eastern Part of Nigeria to Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

This fear of spill over into the neighbouring region was clearly emphasised by many AFIC countries, most notably by Cameroon, Ghana and Niger stating that Boko Haram’s ability to operate across vast areas of northern Nigeria is helped by the porous nature of the borders in the region.

Political leaders of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin recognised this clear threat and have agreed on a regional plan of action to combat Boko Haram. Namely, at the May 2014 Paris summit on Boko Haram, Nigeria and its neighbours pledged to reinforce security measures in areas targeted by Boko Haram, carry out bilateral patrols and share operational intelligence.

**Boko Haram violence spilling over borders**

According to Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), cross-border activity of Boko Haram violence has been an increasing concern in recent years.

**Two most striking recent terrorist acts by Boko Haram in Nigeria as reported by Nigerian authorities present in the AFIC**

**Abduction of School Girls in Chibok**

An unidentified number of gunmen attacked Chibok Local Government Area of Borno and destroyed government properties including the only girls secondary school in the area. Boko Haram attacked the Local Government from 11.30 pm till 1.00 am on Monday and Tuesday (14 and 15 April 2014) and were believed to have abducted 234 female girls from the Government Girls Secondary School (GGSS) in Chibok and proceeded to burn down the school.

Chibok Local Government is about 130 km from Maiduguri, Borno State capital and about 42 km from Damboa Local Government, which is said to have been the third Base of Boko Haram insurgents.

**Nyanyan Bus Station Bombing in Abuja**

In the morning of 14 April 2014, on the same day as the abduction of school girls in Chibok there was a bomb attack at the Nyanyan Bus station suburb of Abuja killing 76 people and injuring 200 others. The explosions took place as several hundred commuters were boarding buses to Abuja.
Haram is almost exclusively a phenomenon associated with 2014. Over the last few years approximately 99% of all Boko Haram violent activities and reported fatalities occurred within Nigeria itself.

It is therefore not surprising that violent conflict has increased dramatically in Cameroon in 2014, with over 25% of these events, and 40% of reported fatalities, attributed to the cross-border activity of Boko Haram.

Cameroon now considers Boko Haram as the main threat for the security of Cameroon. This has caused the administration in Yaoundé to increase its troop level at the border with Nigeria to 3000. In addition to boosting troop levels at the border, Cameroon has also agreed to create a regional defence force made up of 700 soldiers from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad. The reasoning behind this regional defence force is to prevent Boko Haram militants from using the border region between the four countries as a base to launch attacks. Both the UK and France have pledged their support for the force.
Heavy fighting in Nigeria impacts not only on the movements of civilians but also on the regular military force. This can be observed in the case of Nigerian forces moving via Cameroon and back again to Nigeria in order to avoid direct clashes with the well-equipped Boko Haram.

Worryingly, as reported by Cameroon, the tactics of Boko Haram include unexpected attacks on Cameroonian troops from the rear on their own territory. Furthermore, infiltrations of Boko Haram fighters in refugee camps are difficult to identify.

In the case of the apprehension of Boko Haram members of Nigerian citizenship, they are handed over to Nigeria. However, nationality swapping might have taken place in case of Chadian citizens stating to be Nigerians, which is possible due to the linguistic similarity, in order to avoid return to Chad since Nigeria and Chad cooperate well in that field.

On top of the clear security threat, Cameroon is also facing a potential deterioration of the refugee crisis. As of August 2014, local authorities in the Far North Region of Cameroon estimate that as many as 25,000 Nigerians have fled into the region with UNHCR registering some 11,000. Relief agencies in Cameroon estimate that as many as 50,000 Nigerians will have crossed into Cameroon by the end of the year.

In addition to this refugee emergency caused by Boko Haram, Cameroon is also providing refuge to roughly 153,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR). Most of them arrived in early 2014 as hostilities in CAR worsened. The number is expected to rise to 180,000 by the end of 2014.

Cameroonian authorities represented in the AFIC are worried that a massive influx of refugees from both countries may destabilise Cameroon and hamper country’s capacities to host new arrivals. Issues related to cohabitation, food security, schooling and management of local resources are already proving to be difficult to resolve. Furthermore, the Cameroonian authorities have observed an increase of organised crime and a growth of armed robberies as a result.

This problem has also been mentioned by interviewed Cameroonian migrants in southern Spain. According to them, the presence of gangs and groups of thieves in Northern Cameroon, between the borders with Chad and Nigeria as well as the activity of Boko Haram, has led them to change the routes

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**Boko Haram Militants Kidnap Vice Prime Minister’s Wife in Kolofata**

At the end of July 2014 Boko Haram militants managed to kidnap the wife of Cameroon’s Vice Prime Minister Amadou Ali from his residence in the town of Kolofata.

The kidnapping came after Boko Haram increased cross-border raids into Cameroon during recent months. This incident also underscored the precarious security situation in Cameroon’s Far North Region. In fact, violence has spilled over the borders of Nigeria’s neighbours as extremists try to turn Northern Nigeria into an exclusively Islamic state.

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Figure 30. Refugees from the Central African Republic heading for resettlement in Cameroonian villages

© Otto Bakano/IRIN, 2014
Figure 31. Map showing the route previously used by Cameroonian migrants (blue line) and the route currently used in response to violence from Boko Haram and other armed gangs.

Source: JO Indalo

Normally taken (see map). Armed gangs are known for ambushing vehicles on the road and kidnapping, committing thefts and/or murdering people mainly for financial reasons.

As mentioned by other AFIC countries, Boko Haram constitutes a threat not only to Nigeria and neighboring countries but also to other countries further afield. Senegal for example raised a real concern about a possible terrorist attack of Boko Haram during the 15th Francophonie Summit scheduled to take place on 29 and 30 November 2014, which is hosted in the Senegalese capital Dakar.
3.4. Threatened state stability of Libya

Three years after the ousting of Colonel Gadaffi, Libya is in major turmoil caused by rampant factionalism, militia violence, and the absence of a strong central government. The country is awash with weapons and there are roughly 500 different armed militias with various and often mutually exclusive agendas operating in the country.

Heavily armed rival militias are allied with competing political factions and are often only loyal to their region, city or local commanders and not to the central government (even if financed by it and co-opted into the new security structure of Libya). Renewed fighting in Tripoli and Benghazi during July and August 2014 has further polarised the political factions and their militia allies.

The extent of the militia problem was demonstrated by statements made by Libya’s Army Chief of Staff Jadallah Obeidi who publicly admitted that he had no control over the government-funded former rebel groups. He also said that the Defence Ministry has no idea how many people were fighting under the auspices of the Libya Shield Force, a coalition of former rebel groups that was organised by the Defence Ministry in 2012.

The Libyan government is therefore highly vulnerable to interference from militias as has been shown by its inability to prevent militia fighters from blockading key administrative buildings, including government ministries.

Surveillance of Libya’s land borders is also believed to be largely controlled by different militias. These groups conduct patrols near border crossings to monitor the passage of goods and weapons and to intercept irregular migrants who cross the desert border via networks of traffickers. Their main interest in doing so is financial gain.

‘Islamo-gangsterism’ in Libya

The International Crisis Group (ICG) reports that terrorist movements and smuggling networks have entered into a tight relationship in the border areas of Libya, especially in areas that are clearly underdeveloped.

‘This relationship between terrorism and smuggling is expected to provide optimal conditions for the birth of shared gangs of terrorists and smugglers crossing the borders with a high degree of co-ordination’.

The Crisis Group report warned against ‘Islamo-gangsterism’. These gangs blend jihadism and organised crime with contraband networks operating on the borders.

Source: ICG, Tunisia’s Borders: Jihadism and Contraband

A case of 200 Syrian nationals who wanted to travel from Algeria to Libya, and then further on towards Italy in mid-August 2014 is another indication of just how strong the involvement of Libyan militias in human smuggling is. Namely, Algerian authorities prevented the aforementioned group of Syrians from illegally entering Libya where they would have been picked up by a local militia and provided a boat to take them to Italy. This case is probably one of many similar cases where militias financially profit from the fact that they control the border areas of Libya.

Figure 32. Chaos in the eastern city of Benghazi with an alliance of Islamist militants and ex-rebels forcing the army out of the city
The government is unable to disperse the gunmen for both political and practical reasons. It needs to maintain their support to prevent a wider spread of violence and lacks the hard power to enforce existing legislation intended to prevent armed interference in the political process.

The sliding of Libya towards more chaos and violence is of great concern for Libya’s neighbours and countries with large numbers of their citizens in Libya. Tunisia has been faced with a large influx of people fleeing Libya and crossing into Tunisia on a daily basis while countries like Philippines (having a large guest worker community in Libya) have been struggling to organise evacuation ships to carry their nationals to safety.

As a sign of real desperation over the security situation in Libya, Libya’s authorities called upon the international community to intervene in Libya. More precisely, Libya’s newly (August 2014) inaugurated Council of Representatives (which was not able to convene in Tripoli due to hostilities between militias) voted for foreign intervention to protect Libyan civilians. The ‘legal’ framework for an intervention is already in place as Resolution 1973, which passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, is still in force and Libya is bound by it.

Given the experience with the first intervention in Libya, there is little appetite for a new international intervention. Still, Libya’s authorities are looking to form joint forces with Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia to secure the border, curb illegal immigration, and stop arms smuggling and drug trafficking.

Table 3. Distribution of the main Libyan militias and their allegiances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militia</th>
<th>Origin from</th>
<th>Area of operations</th>
<th>Affiliation/s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zintan Revolutionaries Military Council</td>
<td>Zintan</td>
<td>Zintan</td>
<td>National Forces Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli Revolutionaries Council</td>
<td>Zintan</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Non-Islamist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaqa Brigade</td>
<td>Zintan</td>
<td>Zintan (formerly Tripoli)</td>
<td>National Forces Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sawaaq Brigade</td>
<td>Zintan</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>National Forces Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli Military Council</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Islamists, LIFG, Muslim Brotherhood/Justice and Construction Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Deterrent Force</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Islamists, Supreme Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawasi Brigade</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Salafists, Supreme Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misurata Militias</td>
<td>Misurata</td>
<td>Misurata, Tripoli</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood/Justice and Construction Party, Libya Shield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 February Martyrs’ Brigade</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>Islamists, Libya Shield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade</td>
<td>Benghazi</td>
<td>Eastern Libya</td>
<td>Islamists, Libya Shield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar al-Sharia</td>
<td>Benghazi/Derna</td>
<td>Benghazi, Derna, Sirte</td>
<td>Islamists, LIFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of Cyrenaica</td>
<td>Eastern Libya</td>
<td>Eastern Libya</td>
<td>Eastern federalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyrenaica Protection Force</td>
<td>Ajdabiya</td>
<td>Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Zueitina</td>
<td>Eastern federalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade and the</td>
<td>Derna</td>
<td>Derna</td>
<td>Islamists, LIFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Army of Libya</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Frontex, 2014
3.5. Mapping regional security initiatives

All these challenges are prompting countries in the AFIC region to initiate an ever growing number of regional security and development initiatives that sometimes overlap. As indicated by Table 4 below, some countries participate in all initiatives whilst others only take part in one or few. This short chapter briefly presents some of them, focusing mostly on those that are managed by different African organisations or regional governments.

### Nouakchott Process

Faced with a plethora of competing regional cooperation structures, the African Union (AU) has been conducting a mapping exercise of effective regional initiatives. This is done largely under the framework of the Nouakchott Process that was created in March 2013.

The initiative takes its name from the Mauritanian capital where it was launched by the African Union Commission on 17 March 2013 to enhance cooperation in security matters between the Sahel countries and contribute to the operational application of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the region. This process is led by the AU through the African Union Mission in Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL).

The Nouakchott Process comprises of 11 countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad) from the Sahel-Sahara region subject to their membership of the AU, thereby excluding Morocco, which pulled out of the organisation in 1984.

### CEMOC – Comité d’État-Major Opérationnel Conjoint / Joint Operational General Staff Committee

The Comité d’État-Major Opérationnel Conjoint (CEMOC) created in April 2010, was established between Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad) from the Sahel-Sahara region subject to their membership of the AU, thereby excluding Morocco, which pulled out of the organisation in 1984.

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Table 4. Regional security initiatives in the Sahara/Sahel by participating countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PCAR (ECOWAS)</th>
<th>African Union (Sahel strategy)</th>
<th>Sahel G5</th>
<th>Sahel Security College (EU)</th>
<th>Joint Military Staff Committee of Sahel Region (CEMOC)</th>
<th>Fusion and Liaison Unit</th>
<th>Nouakchott Process AU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>•</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

and cross-border operations. The CEMOC, according to Algerian official statements, will ultimately rely on approximately 75,000 men to cover a border of almost 2,000 km.

Based in Tamanrasset (1,800 km to the south of Algiers), the command is led by a field officer (according to an annual rotation by alphabetical order) which has all the services linked to the command of the armed forces posted along the borders between Algeria with Mauritania, Mali and Niger.

Remaining a closed structure due to the lack of willingness in permitting foreign interference, the CEMOC was, since October 2010, joined with the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL), a permanent consultation body between armies and intelligence services of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

One of TSCTP’s flagship operations is the annual Flintlock training programme that brings together troops from across the Sahel for patrolling, marksmanship, and search-and-rescue training. TSCTP developed out of the 2002 Pan-Sahel Initiative, which was part of the US government’s broader global war on terrorism strategy. TSCTP is largely managed by the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).

**External intelligence response unit – Nigeria**

As for international cooperation on terrorism issues, Nigeria has established an External Intelligence Response Unit (EIRU) with the support of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Benin Republic, Cameroon, the Republic of Chad, and Niger.

It was emphasised by the Nigerian authorities that as far as internal cooperation goes, a perceived disunity among security agencies constitutes a grievous threat to law enforcement operations and Border Management. Rivalry among the security agencies – especially in respect of their duties and roles or different workload (ones more than the others) – has resulted in a decline in the area of intelligence gathering and the sharing of security reports.

Nevertheless, international cooperation seems to be improving with the Nigerian government establishing an agreement with IOM in order to set up a programme to entice and prevent migrants and prospective migrants from travelling irregularly. This program is referred to as ‘Assisted Voluntary Returns and Re-integration’, which serves to provide humanitarian assistance to returnees to establish and re-integrate them back into Nigerian society.

Table 5. Risk summary table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Ebola virus and associated very high death rate, Ebola virus spreading beyond the region either through air connections or through irregular migration routes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>Extremely porous regional borders, lack of technical means to halt the spread of virus by proper treatment of patients, quarantine of suspected cases and burial of victims, lack of medical personnel and basic medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>reduced regional mobility, economic losses, loss of human life, deteriorating internal security in the affected countries, rising food insecurity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1. Introduction

The Ebola virus disease (formerly known as Ebola haemorrhagic fever) is a severe and fatal illness, with a case fatality rate of up to 90%. It is one of the world’s most virulent diseases. The infection is transmitted by direct contact with the blood, body fluids and tissues of infected animals or people. Severely ill patients require intensive supportive health care. During an outbreak, those at higher risk of infection are health workers, family members and others in close contact with sick people and deceased patients.

The current outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa started in March 2014. The first report came from Guinea with a total of 49 cases. Since then the virus has spread to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

As of August 2014, the outbreak is rapidly evolving with a noticeable increase of cases. The World Health Organization (WHO) and international organisations are closely supporting the ministries of health of the affected countries.

4.2. Impact on regional borders and mobility

Efforts to stop the spread of Ebola have also included border closures, restricting internal movements and temporary suspension of flights departing from the four West African countries. Some countries (e.g. Zambia) even banned all citizens from Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria from entering their territory.

Border closure amounts largely to closure of official land border crossings and is usually done using very rudimentary technical means, as evidenced by Figure 35 overleaf. Furthermore, Sierra Leone’s responses to the Frontex questionnaire (RFI) indicate that there is a challenge in the institutional capacities of individual agencies charged with the responsibility to manage borders. Most land borders are unmanned by law enforcement officers because of the lack of human and logistical capacities. Similar difficulties are present also in other countries in the region.

Therefore, it remains extremely difficult to prevent people in rural areas crossing the long and porous borders to the most affected areas.
Figure 34. Ebola outbreak in numbers

Ebola virus disease outbreak, West Africa 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Case fatality ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data as of 2014-08-26

Geographic distribution of cases

Geographic distribution of deaths

How many cases and deaths over time?

The frustration is so high that – according to open source reporting – Liberia’s armed forces were given orders to shoot people trying to illegally cross the border from neighbouring Sierra Leone. Soldiers stationed in Bomi and Grand Cape Mount counties, which border Sierra Leone, are to ‘shoot on sight’ any person trying to cross the border. The order reportedly came after Liberian border officials reported that people continued to cross the porous border illegally.

The problem of unofficial border crossings points was extensively described in the first AFIC annual report. When assessing the likely effectiveness of border closure measures it is worth repeating that in West Africa there are at least 10 unofficial crossing points for every official one. For example, in the Grand Cape Mount county of Liberia (severely affected by Ebola), there are 35 known unofficial border-crossing points and only one official point.

Containing the virus is also done by attempting to restrict internal movements. According to open source reports, several governments in the most affected areas instituted a ban on all public gatherings in cities, events and other social activities, including funerals, indefinitely. In Liberia soldiers have also been deployed in many areas to maintain tight quarantines and prevent social unrest.

Restrictions on internal travel include checkpoints and disease testing centres in some of the hardest-hit areas. For instance, after 700 troops were deployed in Sierra Leone to set up roadblocks, area residents reportedly attacked medical personnel, believing the testing centres to cause the spread of Ebola. Authorities in Liberia also proceeded to seal off one affected area that is home to around 75,000 people.

Senegal adopted a general strategy of Ebola containment which includes: prevention and raising of awareness, general epidemic surveillance, support measures for affected ones and the establishment of a Ministerial Management Committee. Border controls were reinforced at the main airport in Dakar and primary sea and land border sections. Additionally, the border with Guinea was closed and the functioning of regional markets was suspended.

4.3. Ebola virus spreading beyond the region of West Africa?

It has been established that containing the virus through the closure of land borders remains an almost impossible task given the difficulties faced by border authorities in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea and the notorious porosity of borders in West Africa. In addition, as claimed by different non-governmental organisations, the extent of the current outbreak might be underestimated.

Air route

The case of Patrick Sawyer, a naturalised American citizen, who flew to Nigeria from
Liberia in late July 2014 and died soon after, shows clearly how the Ebola virus can jump countries very quickly. He had infected at least eight other people, mostly people at the airport, the ECOWAS regional meeting that he was attending* and in the hospital treating him before he died.

As of 14 August 2014, several countries including eighteen EU Member States and Schengen Associated Countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden) have issued travel advice to their citizens to avoid non-essential travel. Likewise, Frontex temporarily suspended joint return operations to the affected countries in mid-August 2014.

Morocco announced extra health screening measures at entry points to the country. As a precautionary measure, the health ministry has stepped up sanitary checks at entry points, especially at Casablanca airport, a key transportation hub for north and West Africa.

Authorities in Cameroon decided to ban all flights coming from Nigeria in response to Ebola case numbers rising in that neighbouring country. This measure was a part of a broader package that included a temporary closure of both land and maritime borders of Cameroon with Nigeria.

Suspension of flights

While the WHO advises against an air travel ban to affected countries arguing that transmission remains low in airline transport, some airlines felt continuing operations was risky. Asky, a major West African airline has stopped flying to Liberia and Sierra Leone after it become clear that Patrick Sawyer (see above) arrived to Nigeria on-board one of its flights from Liberia.

Dubai carrier Emirates was the first major international airline to impose a ban in response to the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa by suspending flights to Guinea on 2 August 2014.

British Airways followed on 5 August 2014 by cancelling flights to Sierra Leone and Liberia, cutting off the only direct links between the UK and the Ebola-infected area of West Africa. The airline suspended the flight ‘due to the deteriorating public health situation in both countries’.

Other major airlines, including Kenyan Airlines, have introduced or are seriously considering suspension of flights to the affected region.

Irregular migration routes

Authorities in Spain and Italy consider the risk of spreading the virus by irregular migrants arriving from Africa to be low given the fact that these migrants usually travel for longer periods and do not come directly from the Ebola-affected areas. In addition, arriving migrants are also screened for symptoms of the Ebola disease upon arrival.

Still, Spain’s government started to apply stricter procedures in Ceuta and Melilla. Everyone taken to the immigration centres of the two cities is given a thorough medical check-up and is automatically placed in isolation at the first sign of any suspicious symptoms.

In Morocco, authorities are not raising alarms for very similar reasons as in Italy and Spain. Still, the risk of the Ebola virus arriving in Morocco is probably marginally higher given the central role Casablanca airport* plays as a regional hub connecting West and North Africa.

* ECOWAS staff member in Lagos Liaison Office Mr Jatto Ashu Abdulqudir who greeted Mr Sawyer at the airport later died because of Ebola. In response, ECOWAS decided to cancel all meetings until further notice.

* Morocco introduced extra health screening measures at entry points to the country, in particular at Casablanca airport.
4.5. Virus not contained, extensive international action needed

As suggested by Senegal, containing the Ebola outbreak is a very challenging task when taking into account the existing ECOWAS free movement of persons and goods, very porous land borders and severe deficiencies of health care systems in the affected countries. Furthermore, the African Union itself opposes closure of the border due to the possible negative socio-economic consequences.

AFIC countries also generally acknowledge that closing of the borders is difficult and might not be effective in the fight against the spread of the virus. High hopes are put on the announced sending of roughly 3,000 US military troops to the West African nation of Liberia as part of the Obama administration’s Ebola virus-response strategy. Liberia is the hardest-hit, accounting for more than one-half of the fatalities.

The longer the Ebola outbreak is not contained (as measured through a drop in new cases being reported in the region) the more likely it becomes that irregular migrants could potentially be arriving to Morocco, Libya, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Bulgaria or Greece infected with the virus.

Libya is most at risk from the virus spreading uncontrollably over land routes given the lack of institutional capacity, the almost total collapse of the Libyan public health sector and the fact that most irregular migrants are likely to transit through Libya.

Flight connections between the affected region and Europe

**Sierra Leone:** there were a total of 31 flights from Freetown to Europe, of which 18 British Airways to London/Heathrow, and 9 Germania to London/Gatwick. As of 5 Aug 2014 British Airways had temporarily suspended flights to and from Liberia and Sierra Leone until 31 August 2014 due to the deteriorating public health situation in both countries.

**Guinea:** there were in total 13 flights from Conakry to Europe, of which 12 Air France to Paris Charles de Gaulle.

**Liberia:** the total number was 16 flights from Monrovia to Europe, of which 15 were operated by Brussels Airlines to Brussels Zaventem.

**Nigeria:** there were a total of 440 flights from Nigeria (mainly from Abuja and Lagos) to Europe. Main Airline Operators: Air France, British Airways, DHL, Lufthansa, Iberia, KLM, Turkish Airlines, and Virgin Atlantic. Non-stop flights are operated by Air France, Alitalia, British Airways, Brussels Airlines, DHL, Iberia, KLM, Lufthansa, Turkish Airlines and Virgin Atlantic.

Others (connections) are operated by Ethiopian (via Addis Ababa), Egypt Air (via Cairo), Royal Jordanian (Amman), Royal Air Maroc (Casablanca), Emirates (Dubai; flights to Conakry suspended since 2 Aug), Etihad (Abu Dhabi), Kenya Airways (Accra and Nairobi, suspended on 17 Aug), Qatar (Doha).

According to IATA, a rough estimate of transported passengers directly and indirectly from Freetown/Conakry/Monrovia/Lagos to Europe is 80,000.
5. Conclusions

The AFIC has grown and matured as a community of experts. This third annual report is a tangible expression of this increasing maturity. However, discussion during the two AFIC workshops revealed a clear need for further development of the community beyond the current workshop-themed model.

While common situational awareness is a necessary precondition for effective policy or operational responses, more efforts should be put into development of close to real-time information sharing platforms and risk analysis capacity building in AFIC countries.

In addition, by continually working with other regional and international actors, the visibility of the AFIC should further be enhanced in order for the policy makers to make an effective use of the knowledge created by the community. These improvements can be clustered into five different initiatives.

Creation of AFIC info sharing platform

Currently, the most commonly used communication channel is email. Several AFIC participants are using only commercially available email accounts (e.g. Yahoo or Google) which are not well suited for efficient and secure information exchange. Therefore, future arrangements should include a centralised, dedicated and secure information-sharing platform that will be accessible through the internet. This would allow for the expansion of the type and number of reports that could be shared within the AFIC. Frontex is willing to take the lead on this and explore what different options are currently available in the European or African context.

Creation of secure email accounts for AFIC participants would also successfully address the issue of commercial email accounts used for official purposes. These measures combined should bring the AFIC community closer to real-time information exchange, a goal that was suggested by several AFIC participants.

Enhancing the information-sharing capacity of AFIC would also facilitate possible field or study visits to one or more AFIC countries based on clearly established needs and invitation from the hosting AFIC country.

Solidifying shared ownership of the AFIC

The AFIC is a community of experts from Africa and Frontex. Given that the agency provides financial, logistical and analytical support to the work of the AFIC, the community is often perceived as solely a Frontex initiative and serving the more narrow interests of the European Union. This perception is misleading and contrary to the original goals of the community.

Addressing these shortcomings could be done through the introduction of sub-regional analytical groups, formed either using linguistic, thematic or geographic criteria with a rotating lead country principle. Regular workshops and joint analysis of these sub-regional analytical groups would be done in Africa with one joint annual workshop in Europe.

Analytical focus of the sub-regional analytical groups would be entirely focused on the main border security or internal security threats faced by African countries themselves. In order to prepare the ground work for the establishment of sub-regional analytical groups,
Frontex would collect a list of topics, border security threats and other important issues from all AFIC countries and then propose a setup of the sub-regional groups. This exercise could be complemented by visits to selected AFIC countries.

The setting up of sub-regional analytical groups should also have a cascading positive effect on improving cross-border cooperation in different regions of Africa. These activities should also serve as a platform for intra-regional sharing of skills or know-how. For example, an AFIC country with a specific expertise (e.g. detecting document fraud at BCPs) could be sharing its knowledge with other AFIC countries using sub-regional analytical groups as the venue.

Building the risk analysis capacity of AFIC countries

The proper analysis of risks is a specialised skill that requires specific training. On the national level, many AFIC countries have no or very rudimentary risk analysis capacity. As reported by Sierra Leone for example, their risk analysis capability is limited to National Threat Assessments done by the Office of National Security.

Understandably therefore, the AFIC community adopted a so-called ‘learning-by-doing’ attitude to joint analysis of risks. However, this approach has achieved its limits and a new dynamic is needed in this regard.

Frontex is engaged with EU Member States, Schengen Associated Countries and third country partners in providing a specialised Frontex Training programme for analysts (Programme FRONBAC). AFIC countries have so far not been able to participate largely due to capacity issues on Frontex side.

This should change in the immediate future and AFIC countries should be given the opportunity to train selected number of analysts in programmes tailored for risk analysis purpose. In addition, Frontex is willing to offer guidance on how best to set up risk analysis units in border control authorities of interested AFIC countries.

Enhancing the AFIC’s visibility

The AFIC is not a formal structure based on international legal instruments. As such, it is not part of any international and/or regional organisation. It functions as an informal cooperation platform based on the mutual interest of all participants.

Its unique character allows it to be quite flexible in terms of what topics to jointly analyse and thus generate specific knowledge.

Bringing the work of the AFIC closer to the main international and regional actors in the wider field of border security and migration management should benefit from the following initiatives:

- increasing the number of printed copies of reports available for further distribution by AFIC members;
- representing the AFIC in regional meetings. This can be done both by Frontex and participating AFIC countries;
- exploring options for the wider electronic and secure dissemination of AFIC reports to the relevant policy makers in Africa and Europe;
- creation of a short summary of the report (up to three pages) that would allow high-level readers to absorb the main elements of the report;
- using good offices of EU Delegations on a case-by-case basis to disseminate the AFIC Joint Report in Africa.
Providing technical support for joint risk analysis purposes

AFIC countries have in some cases difficulties regarding access to basic office equipment, including computers, and electronic communication infrastructure. This is severely hindering their ability to collect, analyse and disseminate information required in the content of AFIC joint analysis.

As a first step in remedying these deficiencies, a needs assessment should be performed and presented to the European Commission that is managing the different funds that can be used for technical support in third countries.

The goal of this exercise would be to enhance the capacity of individual AFIC countries to engage in the analysis of risks and thus improve the collective efforts of the AFIC.
6. Annex

**Threat-scanning exercise**

In order to facilitate selection of appropriate subjects and the creation of AFIC sub-regional analytical groups, all AFIC participants were invited to list up to ten border security threats that their country is currently facing (e.g. smuggling of migrants, corruption, etc.). In addition, AFIC participants were asked to describe each threat by the most typical recent case or cases.

Each listed threat is qualified in terms of relative magnitude with a score from 1 to 5, where 1 is low magnitude and 5 is very high magnitude. AFIC participants also presented the most important difficulties they are experiencing when trying to mitigate the listed threats.

Only contributions from Ghana and Burkina Faso for this ‘threat-scanning’ exercise were received at the time of finalisation of this report (see details below for top five threats); however, Frontex will continue to work with all AFIC participants to complete the threat picture. This should greatly facilitate the work of AFIC sub-regional analytical groups.

**Ghana**

1. **Human Smuggling and trafficking – level 5**

*The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered*

Eight women aged between twenty and twenty-eight were offered lucrative jobs in Kuwait. On arrival in Kuwait they were grouped with other women, packed in a small room where the smugglers’ clients make their selection of the type of girl they want. The girls ended up as house helpers and some were forced into prostitution. They were paid USD 200 a month and were all maltreated.

Six Bangladeshis were smuggled into Ghana through an irregular route along the Aflao border post. They were housed in a hotel and had to pay USD 10,000 to their smugglers who promised a passage to Europe. After four months of fruitless wait, the victims complained and the smugglers chained the victims to the ground.

*The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat*

- Language (needed translators) difficulty in the case of the Bangladeshis
- Lack of facilities to house the victims
- Difficulty in using victims as prosecution witnesses
- Financing – upkeep of victims
- Logistics, transportation, etc.
- Training of officers to detect these crimes

*Other important issues*

Difficulty in communication with some countries to continue to investigate while we repatriate the victims e.g. with the case of the Bangladeshis victims and smugglers were all repatriated.

2. **Smuggling of fuel and cocoa – level 5**

*The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered*

What is smuggled varies from one border post to another. The smuggling of cocoa is
very common at the Western borders along the Dedieso, Gonokrom, Kofi Badukrom and Kwame SieKrom entry points. Several bags each day are encountered. The smuggling is done at night through the bush paths and attempts to apprehend result in scuffles between the smugglers and border officials, some resulting in gun shot casualties.

Fuel smuggling is mostly done along the Northern and Eastern border. A case in point is at the Paga border post, where donkeys are attached to a cart and loaded with drums of fuel and trained to move across the unmanned section of the border stretch without a guard or the owners.

The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat

- Locally manufactured arms hidden in scattered locations
- Lack of trust for informants
- Opinion leaders harbour and shield the perpetrators

4. Drug trafficking – level 5

The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered

Six Nigerians were arrested for Drug Trafficking using the Kotoka International Airport. All were found to have swallowed pallets of heroin each with a street value of over USD 80 000. They all arrived from Pakistan, a well-known area for the cultivation of opium poppy.

The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat

- Extremely slow judicial procedures coupled with the lack of proper mechanisms to investigate the issues, leading to culprits being acquitted or the case dropped for lack of evidence.

5. Illegal Entry and Exit – level 5

The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered

Ghana like any other ECOWAS country has vast and porous borders and this has made entry through unmanned or unapproved points a source of concern. Taking into consideration the recent haemorrhagic fever (Ebola) and Terrorism.

A recent case in question is the Ghana Togo border Stretch in the Volta Region where the demarcation fence that separated the two countries was destroyed and illegal entries increased. Border residents were reported to
be extorting people using these unapproved routes created by the collapse of the fence.

The biggest challenge has been the ability to be able to screen and find out who is supposed to enter the country. The reality is that motor bikes are used to transport travellers across the routes.

The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat
- Porous borders therefore difficult to monitor
- Logistics – lack of all terrain vehicles and motor bikes
- Language barrier – French and English

**Burkina Faso**

1. **Drugs trafficking – level 3**

   The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered
   Significant seizures by the police

   The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat
   - Poorly trained staff
   - Porous borders
   - Inadequate security network
   - Lack of efficient detection equipment

2. **Trafficking of children – level 3**

   The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered
   Regular interceptions of children trafficked

   The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat
   - Porous borders
   - Poverty
   - Lack of consideration for child wellbeing

3. **Trafficking in Human Beings – level 2**

   The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered
   - Frequent arrests of persons involved in this criminal activity in the cities of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso

   The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat
   - Poverty
   - Desire for easy money

4. **Document fraud – level 2**

   The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered
   - Seizures of fake documents by the police (passports, diplomas, residence permits)

   The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat
   - Poor qualification of personnel
   - Lack of detection equipment
   - Lack of security features of vital documents

5. **Arms trafficking – level 2**

   The most typical case or cases that you have recently encountered
   - Frequent use of weapons during the assault by offenders against individuals or vehicles of public transport on roads
   - Weapons seized during the searches of the judicial police

   The most important difficulties you are experiencing when trying to mitigate this threat
   - Porous borders
   - Many conflicts in the sub-region
   - Weak monitoring capacity of the security forces
   - Desire of the people to protect themselves against potential attacks at home
FRONTEX

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